Which supplier should control the default slot on digital devices? We analyze alternative ways to assign the default position for digital goods like search engines. First, we show that competitive bidding for the default usually rewards the higher-quality incumbent, yet it can reduce consumer welfare by cranking up ads and data extraction. Second, and perhaps surprisingly, giving the challenger a regulatory slice of defaults dulls rivalry and raises both firms’ profits while harming consumers. Third, “choice screens” boost short-run consumer...

ANTITRUST

DIGITAL LAW

COMPLEXITY SCIENCE

LATEST PUBLICATIONS

On Simple Competition Policy

In this article, Keith N. Hylton challenges the idea that simplicity in competition policy can be achieved through rigid statutory...

Harnessing the transformative benefits of AI to maximize competition, innovation and competitiveness

Artificial Intelligence (“AI”) has transformative economic potential across all sectors. This article explores how to harness AI’s potential while maintaining...

Antitrust In the Digital Era: A Contextual and Fact-Based Approach

European antitrust policy, designed for the industrial era, is inadequate for digital markets driven by innovation and differentiation. Against this...

Brazilian Merger Policy in Digital Markets: What Can We Expect in 2025?

This article analyzes Brazil's approach to digital market mergers, examining 2024 Ministry of Finance proposals to reform competition policy. Despite...

Ecosystems in Competition Law: A U.S. Perspective

Christopher S. Yoo argues that ecosystem-based theories have had limited impact on U.S. antitrust law due to conceptual vagueness and...

A New Paradigm for Antitrust in the Digital Sector

This article examines why traditional antitrust approaches fail to address digital market power effectively. Analyzing U.S. enforcement data from 1995-2023,...

Dynamic Capabilities and EC Merger Control: A Difficult Match?

This paper examines the proposed use of “dynamic capabilities” analysis in European merger control as authorities increasingly focus on innovation...

Merger Enforcement in the High-Tech Economy: The Role for a Dynamic Capabilities Framework

This article examines whether merger enforcement in high-technology industries has systematically failed to account for innovation effects and assesses the...

Lessons From Empirical Work on Market Dynamics

Ariel Pakes surveys advances in dynamic market analysis since the mid-1990s, highlighting how empirical tools have evolved beyond static frameworks....

EU Competition Law

By Makis Komninos

TECH MONOPOLY

BY HERBERT HOVENKAMP

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Crane's Cartel

By Daniel Crane

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By Catalina Goanta

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